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Through a grounded analysis of NASA's ERP implementation that spans the four years after the 
system went live, we motivate the importance of loose coupling to the study of enterprise systems, 
identify three forms of loose coupling associated with enterprise systems, and detail the evolution 
of activity that is loosely coupled from the system. We conclude by suggesting that loose coupling 
that is mediated by either system or human intermediaries follows a process of mutual adaptation 
and may result in a state of loosely coupled equilibrium that can be beneficial to the organization 
and its knowledge workers. Loose coupling that is mediated by human interpretation, on the other 
hand, results in drift that can enable individual flexibility and situated action, but may undermine 
imperatives of control and may render data in the enterprise system less meaningful. 
Résumé  
Grâce à une analyse enracinée de l’implantation du PGI de la NASA menée sur les quatre années 
qui ont suivi le lancement du système, nous identifions un faible couplage entre les pratiques 
locales et les données présentes dans le système, mettant à jour à la fois des aspects 
« d’adaptation mutuelle » et de « dérive ». Ce faible couplage peut être bénéfique ou bien réduire 
les impératifs de contrôle associés à un système d'information intégré.  
 
Keywords:  Enterprise resource planning, Interpretive methods, IT alignment 
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Introduction 
Innovation and efficiency are two central concerns for organizations in today’s globally competitive environment 
(Schumpeter 1946; March 1991).  In addition to these two primary motivators, in recent years there have been 
dramatic increases in reporting requirements associated with regulatory compliance (e.g., Sarbanes Oxley; etc.), 
quality standards (e.g., ISO/9000, etc.), and the ever-increasing managerial thirst for more, often real-time, 
information. In order to address many of these concerns, organizations implement enterprise wide information 
systems (e.g., enterprise resource planning, or ERP) which promise to integrate and streamline processes across and 
between organizations, and to enable ready reporting of the data associated with these processes (Davenport 1998).  
Thus by integrating, or “tightly coupling,” processes and groups through an enterprise system, many organizations 
look to address this variety of pressures.  However, complex organizations are often conceived as “loosely coupled” 
systems, where many processes and groups are necessarily insulated from each other in order to allow different 
specialties to attend to different, often incongruent pressures, and thus adapt and persist over time (Orton & Weick 
1990; Perrow 1984).  In particular, loose coupling within organizations is deemed critical to issues relating to 
innovation and knowledge creation (Brusoni & Prencipe 2001).  
While a number of researchers have emphasized the merits of tight coupling in the ability of enterprise systems to 
enable integration, efficiency, and certain forms of organizational agility (e.g., Weill et al 2002; Sambamurthy et al 
2003), others have indicated that this tight coupling involves a trade-off and may rigidify processes making them 
harder to change, and also might limit individual human mindfulness (Gosain 2004; Kallinikos 2004).  Still others 
question the possibility of the tight coupling associated with enterprise systems at all – especially on a global scale 
(Ciborra 2000). Such critiques of enterprise systems generally emphasize the criticality of locally situated action. 
This tension between loose and tight coupling is fundamental to the discourse on enterprise systems, though 
typically not explicitly. Enterprise systems are often implemented to more tightly couple, or integrate, organizational 
units and processes (Barki & Pinsonneault 2005; Gattiker & Goodhue 2005; Srivardhana & Pawlowski 2007).  This 
integration requires that the enterprise system, in turn, be tightly coupled to the practices that they are intended to 
support (Amrani et al 2006).  This tight coupling implies (1) that the material aspects of the enterprise system are 
embedded in (and, in turn, embed) the relevant organizational practice (i.e., performative aspect), and (2) that the 
data in the system (i.e., material aspect) faithfully represents the data associated with the relevant practices (i.e. 
ostensive aspect; Feldman & Pentland 2003; Volkoff et al 2007).   
While much of the literature does, in fact, identify situations where tight coupling is evident and advantageous (e.g., 
Davenport 1998; Volkoff et al 2005; Gattiker & Goodhue 2005), some research on enterprise systems highlights 
situations where the system is not embedded in the relevant practices as expected, the data does not necessarily 
reflect the data within performative practices, or both (Pollock & Cornford 2004; Wagner & Newell 2004; Soh et al 
2003; Cordella & Simon 2000; Allen 2005; Boudreau & Robey 2005).   
All of these examples point to the loose coupling between performative organizational aspects of organizational 
processes and their ostensive aspects embodied by the enterprise systems that are intended to manage these 
processes.  The presence of this loose coupling indicates the absence of complete system and process integration 
implied by the enterprise system, and may even indicate serious problems with data integrity.  Thus the 
ramifications of loose coupling in an enterprise system context can be dramatic.  However, beyond simply pointing 
out the situations where practice is loosely coupled from the enterprise system, research has done little to understand 
the phenomenon of loose coupling in an enterprise system context. Others have discussed the causes of loose 
coupling in a variety of organizational contexts (e.g., Wagner & Newell 2004; Soh & Sia 2004; Ciborra 2000), but 
there has been limited differentiation between the types of loose coupling.  Further, there has been little discussion 
of how organizations deal with loose coupling, and the effects of loose coupling on key organizational outcomes 
such as the level of integration of a process, the control of a process, and the satisfaction of knowledge workers.  
With this in mind, we ask two fundamental questions to guide our research: When is loose coupling desirable, and 
when is it not desirable?  How does loose coupling play out over time? 
In this paper we present study of loose coupling that spans the four years following NASA’s ERP implementation.  
This research represents an effort to begin addressing the questions listed above through the generation of a 
theoretical framework of the types of loose couplings and the way that these loose couplings play out over time.  
NASA is a particularly relevant context for the study of loose coupling and enterprise systems, because it is a highly 
complex organization that is driven by both loosely and tightly coupled imperatives (Perrow 1984).  NASA is 
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engaged in radical innovation on par with any terrestrial organization, while at the same time subject to acute 
reliability concerns and the efficiency issues of any organization with limited resources (Starbuck & Farjoun 2005).  
Also, NASA faces political, regulatory, and reporting concerns associated with being a large high-visibility 
government agency.  NASA is a prime example of an extreme case (Yin 2003) who’s highly publicized experiences 
resonate with a variety of organizational phenomena across industries (Farjoun & Starbuck 2007). 
We organize the paper as follows.  First we draw attention to the importance of the concepts of loose and tight 
coupling to organizational analyses, as well as to enterprise systems in particular.  Then we will introduce our 
framework of three basic forms of loose coupling and the notions of “mutual adaptation” and “drift,” which are 
central to the analysis.  Next we present our longitudinal analysis of three situations of loose coupling that were 
evident in our data, and the way these situations played out over time.  We will conclude with a discussion of the 
consequences and tradeoffs associated with different forms of loose coupling in NASA’s enterprise systems context. 
Loose Coupling and Organizations 
Loose coupling refers situations where organizational elements are not integrated, yet are still responsive to each 
other in some fashion (Orton & Weick 1990).  Loose coupling is a dialectic concept intended to offer an alternative 
to both tightly coupled and decoupled system concepts.  Tightly coupled systems are highly integrated and 
responsive to each other, while non-coupled systems are completely separate and unresponsive (Orton & Weick 
1990).  It is important to note, however, that loose coupling does not imply a midpoint on a continuum with non-
coupling on one end and tight coupling on the other, as is often implied by the term (Brusoni & Prencipe 2001).  
Rather, loose coupling indicates the presence of both decoupling and tight coupling.   For example, in describing an 
organization as “loosely coupled,” one merely indicates that there is tight coupling between certain groups and 
practices, and non-coupling between others.  Loose coupling implies the simultaneous coexistence of both 
rationality and indeterminism at points across an organization (Orton & Weick 1990).  
As a theoretical device, loose coupling is particularly useful for unpacking relationships involving integration 
(Brusoni & Prencipe 2001).  Loose coupling is adaptable to multiple levels of analysis (technical, conceptual, social, 
organizational, supra-organizational, etc.) and can be used as a construct in support of multi-level theorizing (Orton 
& Weick 1990).  For example, on the micro-level of organizational decision making, Cohen and associates (1972) 
describe the way that problems and solutions can be loosely coupled. At the other extreme, on a macro-level, Hallett 
& Ventresca (2006) use the notion of loose coupling to describe the emergence of societal-level institutions.  
Within organizations, neither loose or tight coupling is always beneficial - there is often a trade-off between loose 
and tightly coupled activities.  Tightly coupled systems are generally more controlled, less flexible, but can be 
highly efficient in situations where patterns of activity are invariant, whereas loosely coupled systems, on the other 
hand, tend to be rife with slack, buffers and redundancy, and therefore tend to be inefficient, but are highly adaptable 
to external shocks (Perrow 1984).  Further, within organizations that must satisfy multiple, often conflicting 
demands, loose coupling can enable organizations to be more effective.  For example, through tactics such as 
“ceremonial” conformity with certain expectations in order to give the appearance of compliance organizations can 
satisfy multiple conflicting demands and maintain legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1977).   
While research on enterprise systems is primarily concerned with the merits of tight coupling, it is important to take 
a balanced perspective on the trade-offs associated with tight and loose coupling in an enterprise system context.  
Next we will address the ways that loose coupling is addressed in the literature and present our research questions. 
Loose Coupling and Enterprise Systems 
Large-scale, standardized enterprise information systems are implemented across a wide array of local, idiosyncratic 
practices in and across organizations.  In order for such systems to be successful, they must be adapted into 
organizational environments, and these adaptations involve customization of the system or modifications to 
organizational practices (Davenport 1998; Markus et al 2000; Soh & Sia 2004).  Once the system becomes fully 
utilized, organizational practices are thought to be aligned, or tightly coupled, with the enterprise system.  This tight 
coupling between the system and organizational activity is necessary for realization of the integration and control 
that is typically associated with enterprise systems (Ciborra 2000; Amrani et al 2006; Srivardhana & Pawlowski 
2007). In order to realize the promise of enterprise integration, that is, tightly coupling organizational groups and 
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processes (Barki & Pinsonneault 2005; Srivardhana & Pawlowski 2007), and to control this activity enterprise 
systems must be aligned, or tightly coupled, with organizational activity (Amrani et al 2006).   
Enterprise systems are based on standardized software packages that are meant to cover a wide range of 
organizations with generic, adaptable procedures (aka “best practices,” see Wagner et al 2006).  Thus enterprise 
systems are not value-neutral, and embed or carry certain imperatives and logics to the organizational practices 
(Davenport 1998; Gosain 2005; Wagner et al 2006; Volkoff et al 2007).   Since existing routines are historically and 
idiosyncratically routed in specialized organizational contexts, initial “gaps” or “differences” between the 
technology and existing practice is often quite dramatic (Davenport 1998, Soh et al 2003).   
 
 
Figure 1.  The Image of Mutual Adaptation 
 
There are a number of responses available to organizational actors to address these misalignments in an enterprise 
system context.  For example, an organization can change its practices to fit those implied by the software 
(Davenport 1998).  Alternatively, the software can be configured (Markus et al 2000; Soh et al 2003) or customized 
significantly (Soh & Sia 2004; Robey et al 2002) to support existing organizational practices.  The alignment of the 
software with organizational practices is often characterized as a process of “mutual adaptation” (Leonard-Barton 
1988, see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 2.  The Image of Drift 
 
However, within this customization and adaptation space there remains a wide opportunity for user “work-arounds” 
or improvisations in many forms (Soh et al 2003; Boudreau & Robey 2005; Wagner & Newell 2004).  The sum of 
work-arounds and improvisations can lead to a form of organizational “drift”, where managers, in an effort to 
increase control, drive ever-increasing levels of action outside of the system (Ciborra 2000). 
A response that is not often well-articulated in information systems research is the simultaneous acceptance and 
resistance of the system in a local practice.  In such cases, business processes may appear to be compliant with the 
system, yet ongoing activities continue outside the system, often inconsistent or directly contradictory to the 
imperatives or logics of the enterprise system.  Researchers have identified two important aspects of business 
processes: the performative and the ostensive aspects (Feldman & Pentland 2003).  To these, the material aspects of 
the enterprise system represent a third element of business processes (Volkoff et al 2007).  The ostensive aspect 
captures the way individuals view the process, how they think about the process, and how they account for activities 
in the process.  The performative aspect involves the situated carrying out of organizational tasks.  “The ostensive 
aspect of the routine is the idea; the performative aspect, the enactment.” (Feldman & Pentland, 2003 p.102)   
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While much of the literature does, in fact, identify situations where tight coupling is evident and advantageous (e.g., 
Davenport 1998; Volkoff et al 2005; Gattiker & Goodhue 2005), some (largely qualitative, case-based) research on 
enterprise systems highlights situations where the system is not embedded in the relevant practices as expected, the 
data does not necessarily reflect the data driving the practice, or both.   
Table 1. Forms of Loose Coupling Evident in Enterprise System Literature 
Form of Loose 
Coupling 
Relevant ERP Benefit Compromised by 
Loose Coupling (and associated concepts) 
Relevant Business 
Process Source 
Process task Process integration (tasks, activities, processes) 
Faculty purchasing ; 
patient scheduling; study 
monitoring 
Wagner & Newell 2005; 
Pollock & Cornford 2004; Sia et 
al 2003; Cordella & Simon 2000 
Activity 
reporting 
Control  (visibility, accountability, 
procedural focus) 
Customer order entry; 
purchase requisition 
Allen 2005; Boudreau & Robey 
2005 
Systems System integration (data, information, 
applications, functional groups) Reporting Boudreau & Robey 2005 
 
For example, in settings where enterprise systems have been implemented in university contexts, a number of 
researchers have found that administrative people reconcile unchanged faculty procurement activities with the 
newly-implemented enterprise systems, thus avoiding the need for faculty to use the system, but also thus 
relinquishing a portion of the control and integration expected from the implementation (Pollock & Cornford 2004; 
Wagner & Newell 2004).  In another example, nurses in a hospital were focused on patient care, and, although 
clerks enforced perfunctory use of the system, nurses would engage in patient scheduling activity outside of the 
system, only to reconcile it later (Soh et al 2003).  Similarly, in a pharmaceutical company, “study monitors” were 
expected to input data directly into the system during the day, but Cordella & Simon (2000) found that this data was, 
in fact, captured after working hours and often on paper.  In a study of a manufacturing firm, buyer/planners 
inputted critical orders into the system before they were actually realized – a practice that went against the very rules 
embedded into the system, but enabled them to engage in superior customer service (Allen 2005).  Also, a number 
of examples point to misappropriation of fields in the data – such as the “header” that organizations use for a variety 
of unintended purposes; as well as the presence of “shadow systems” to facilitate activity that is unwieldy directly 
with the enterprise system, such as reporting (e.g., Boudreau & Robey 2005) 
Table 1 represents an initial framework we used to organize the different forms of loose coupling we found in the 
literature.  We indicate that loose “process task” coupling involves the timing or performance of activities differently 
than the expectations of the system (Pollock & Cornford 2004; Wagner & Newell 2004; Soh et al 2003; Cordella & 
Simon 2000), which may compromise the benefit of process integration that is often attributed to enterprise systems.  
Situations where the data in the system is not faithful to the data associated with practices they are intended to 
represent (Allen 2005; Boudreau & Robey), can be described as “activity reporting” loose coupling.  Also, situations 
where alternative systems were used to obtain data due to problems consuming enterprise system information 
(Boudreau & Robey 2005) can be referred to as loose “system” coupling.   
Although there is some treatment of time in the data, showing how certain instances of loose coupling get resolved 
or institutionalized over time (Boudreau & Robey 2005; Wagner & Newell 2006), there is no specific attempt to 
theoretically understand the instances and resolutions of loose coupling over time.  Using this initial framework of 
the forms of loose coupling (Table 1), as well as the images of mutual adaptation and drift (Figures 1 &2), we will 
next turn to our analysis of NASA’s ERP implementation in an attempt to generate theory about the way different 
forms of loose coupling play out in an organizational context.   
Research Method    
We conducted a four-year longitudinal field study of NASA’s agency-wide implementation of an ERP system.  The 
objective of the study was to understand individual responses to an enterprise system implementation through the 
practices that those individuals. As revelation rather than generalization is the goal for this research, a single, 
extreme, case was deemed adequate (Yin 2003).   The research proceeded in two main phases, and involved 110 
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interviews.  NASA went live with the ERP system in 2003, and in our first round of data collection, spanning 2003-
2004 we conducted 68 interviews throughout Agency Headquarters in Washington D.C. and two different centers.  
Then we returned to NASA in 2007-2008 and conducted 42 interviews, many with the same people, but often with 
different people in the same or similar positions.    
Data were collected using open-ended interviews (Yin 2003) typically one hour in duration.  Because the research 
deals primarily with personal perceptions of individuals about the enterprise system implementation and their tactics 
for reacting to this implementation, strictly structured interviewing did not apply.  Rather, we looked to understand 
specific events and their contexts before embarking on any given line of questioning.  Therefore, interviewees were 
treated more as “informants” than “respondents” throughout the interviewing process (Yin 2003; p.90).  The 
interviews were not entirely unstructured, as informants were asked to bring examples of positive and negative 
experiences associated with the enterprise system implementation with them to the interview.  During the interview, 
we followed a general process of asking personal information about the individual, her position, and the activities 
that she engages in on a regular basis.  Then two broad areas of the enterprise system implementation were 
specifically addressed through open-ended questioning, namely, the Integrated Financial Management (IFM), and 
the Full Cost Program, which is activity-based costing enabled by ERP.  A research database and central repository 
were created for the research project (Yin 2003).  The research repository included every transcribed interview, as 
well as all digital documentation and a number of internal NASA reports about the implementation, as well as audit 
reports concerning the enterprise system implementation from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the 
NASA Advisory Council (NAC), and the Inspector General (IG).  In order to triangulate our interpretation of the 
events (Yin 2003), a full case write-up was collaboratively created by the authors and submitted to NASA 
management.  They agreed that our depiction of events was accurate.   
The interview data were analyzed following Strauss & Corbin’s (1988) model of grounded theory development, 
which involved three rounds of coding with continuous iteration between the data and our theoretical interests 
(Eisenhardt 1989) for the first set of interviews. This iteration helped amplify our theoretical sensitivity (Strauss & 
Corbin 1988) through the extraction of themes such as ‘misalignments’, ‘logics,’ ‘loose coupling,’ and 
‘reconciliation mechanisms’ (i.e. the ways in which loose coupling was enabled).  To organize and display the data 
we used ‘conceptually ordered descriptive matrices’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994), which are used to order 
qualitative data for subsequent clustering and partitioning.  We operationalized these matrices through a Microsoft 
Access database that contained records with detailed information about each informant, which were then related to 
records containing that informant’s descriptions of misalignments, responses to the ERP system, and a variety of 
codes for the type of misalignment and type of response.  Subsequent axial coding outputted to an Excel 
spreadsheet, combined with notes taken from non-interview data, supports our analysis of the initial data set. The 
second round of data collection was more focused and involved understanding the way in which specific instances 
of loose coupling played out over time.  Transcriptions from the second round of data collection were organized 
using the codes generated by the analysis of the initial interviews and the literature, through Atlas.ti software (for 
qualitative data coding and analysis).  Next, we will briefly introduce the context of the NASA case study. 
NASA’s Structure  
NASA was established in 1958 with the passage of National Aeronautics and Space Act.  From the beginning, 
separate centers were established in order to meet unique challenges of fulfilling the mission of the Agency.  Over 
time, each center has established its own unique competencies, culture, organizational structure, and technical 
infrastructures.  This has resulted in “stove-piped” information systems, organizational processes, accounting 
standards, and cultures at each center and for the wide array of functional groups within each center. Each functional 
area built systems in order to meet their idiosyncratic needs, without regard to compatibility with other locations. 
Also, similar capabilities and knowledge resources were established in different centers, resulting in redundant 
investment.   
Beyond the ten centers, NASA had seven “Strategic Enterprises” that cut across individual centers (at the time of 
data collection).  These are programs such as space exploration and aeronautics research that are funded from NASA 
headquarters and use resources across multiple centers.  NASA’s management structure, with dual layers of centers 
and enterprises, is mirrored in the way each center is organized with program and project offices in addition to 
performing organizations.   
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Performing organizations provide engineering, scientific, and technical capabilities within centers, but centers also 
provide other services described within NASA as “institutional functions” such as accounting, physical assets, and 
information technology.  Examples of performing organizations at Glenn (the Center in Cleveland, Ohio) include the 
Space Flight, Safety and Mission Assurance, and Research and Technology directorates, among others.  Within each 
of these broad organizations are specialized “offices,” for example, within the Space Flight Directorate (which 
focuses on propulsion technology for space vehicles) there is the Advanced Flight Office, the Launch Systems 
Office, etc.  These offices often have subgroups that specialize further.  Program and project managers within the 
strategic enterprises coordinate and fund the activity of performing organizations across centers to fulfill the 
missions of those enterprises.  On top of this complex structure, NASA has encourages competition among centers 
in order to produce the best possible outcomes. Centers compete for the program funds with independent proposals.  
This broad view of NASA’s structure points toward a set of nested organizations with a variety of sometimes 
conflicting goals.  As an Agency, while the ostensible goal of NASA involves space exploration and science, to 
support this goal the center must also engage in administrative activity, advocacy for funding, etc.  Similarly, while 
the overall goal of Glenn as a Center involves maintaining the Center’s health, this could involve efficient and 
effective operations as well as the maintenance and development of certain competencies that improve the position 
of Glenn relative to other centers.  This relative positioning and competition between Centers may be in-line with 
certain aspects of the overall mission of NASA, and it may be in conflict with certain other aspects of NASA’s 
mission.  That is, this inter-center competition may result in redundant capabilities which may conflict with 
efficiency goals of the agency, but may be in-line with the goals relating to scientific progress.  
From this brief analysis, we see NASA as an organization within the wider organization of the U.S. Federal 
Government that is comprised of multiple, nested organizations, whose goals and activities can be consistent with 
each other, but also can be in conflict.  Further, NASA has recently been subject to pressure and scrutiny from other 
branches of the U.S. government.  The tragedies associated with the Columbia and Challenger space shuttle crashes 
have led to probes into NASA’s organizational practices. Resulting from these investigations, a lack of 
communication and collaboration has been recognized as an organizational problem within NASA1.  For example, 
the findings in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report2 reinforced the necessity of inter-center 
communication and collaboration.  This has led to the “One NASA” initiative where the NASA is looking to break 
down the silos and collaborate and communicate across all centers more effectively during the first phase of our 
study.  In the second phase of the study, informants de-emphasized One NASA, and instead focused on the new 
“Ten Healthy Centers” initiative.  
The Executive branch of the U.S. Government has also been focusing on greater accountability and efficiency from 
its Agencies with initiatives such as Clinton-Gore’s “Reinventing Government” and Bush’s “Presidential 
Management Agenda.”  In addition, there have been a series of regulatory and statutory requirements that NASA 
needs to meet in financial management. These include the Chief Financial Officer’s Act of 1990, the Federal 
Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996, and OMB Circular A-127 that requires a single integrated system 
for financial management.  In the past two decades, NASA has failed twice in attempting the implementation an 
integrated financial management system.  The Agency has also undergone a variety of restructuring activities and 
management initiatives over the years, such as Total Quality Management and ISO certification.  Although upper 
management of NASA has traditionally been picked from the ranks of the scientific community, President Bush 
appointed Sean O’Keefe, a self-described “bean counter” as head of NASA in 2000 – the first non-technical head of 
the Agency since the early 1960s, who was Administrator during the time of the initial phase of this study.  Mike 
Griffin, a scientist who spent the bulk of his career in NASA replaced O’Keefe in 2005.   
Findings 
In our analysis of situations that involve the loose coupling of organizational practice to the enterprise system, we 
identified multiple instances for each category.  In the interest of space, we will present one example for each form 
of loose coupling, and describe how this loose coupling played out over four years. 
                                                          
1
 For academic analysis of these tragedies and related insight into the NASA organization, see Starbuck & Farjoun 2005 
2
 As a U.S. government agency, a great deal of documentation on NASA is available in the public domain.  This report is 
available at: http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html . 
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Table 2. Forms of Loose Coupling in NASA’s ERP Implementation 
Form of Loose 
Coupling NASA Example Enabling Mechanism 
Process task Researcher purchasing  Technicians / administrative people mediating researcher system use; 
circumvention through bank cards 
Activity reporting Time reporting Shadow systems (spreadsheets) to track actual budgets; creative interpretation of time reporting 
Systems Project tracking Shadow systems used for project management are periodically reconciled 
with the enterprise system 
  
Process Task Loose Coupling – Researcher Purchasing 
Research personnel of the performing organizations are highly educated and narrowly focused in their fields of 
expertise.  Many indicated that they joined NASA because of the glamour of space and their fascination with 
research that “pushes the envelope.”  PhDs among researchers are highly common, and when asked what they do, 
highly technical replies were often forthcoming.  Researchers at NASA Glenn focus largely upon technical concerns 
associated with groundbreaking discoveries in areas such as propulsion and materials science. Their research cannot 
be controlled procedurally, but activity is dictated by the norms of the relevant profession, by scientific method, and 
the practices of design and experimentation.   
The sentiment among researchers is that they are responsible for the “real” work of NASA, and that any distraction 
from this is wasteful.  There is a general notion among researchers that their activity is more valuable than 
administrators, “because there’s those who control and those who want to get stuff done” (Research Lead, interview 
transcript 2-11-04).  Researchers consider themselves to be those who “get stuff done.”   
Throughout the course of their professional efforts, researchers often needed to purchase a wide variety of items to 
support their research – from supplies to computer hardware and software to external contracts for research activities 
to universities and companies.  In the past researchers submitted paper purchase request forms to clerical staff, who 
in turn managed purchasing activity.  As part of the ERP system implementation, researchers were expected to 
conduct all of their purchasing activity directly with the ERP system.  Thus the ERP system can maintain a single 
point of data capture at its source, and integrate activities from this point through ordering, delivery, and payment.  
Further, by requiring all purchasing activity to be conducted through the system, purchases can be better controlled.  
This is important as many items, such as personal computers, are highly regulated and limited, and product 
specification and vendor selection is a formal and laborious process. 
Researcher responses to the ERP system were mixed.  Some circumvented the system entirely – using credit cards 
known as “P-cards” to purchase items and thus following a different, less labor-intensive procedure that required 
fewer approvals, and enabled researchers to purchase whatever products from whichever vendors they choose.  In 
certain areas P-card use was either inappropriate or limited by management, and researchers tended to work through 
a single administrative person for purchases rather than interface directly with the system.  In one case, a researcher 
who initially signed up as a “super-user” and was first to be trained, indicated that he later fully mediate his system 
use through an administrative person: 
“We have an executive assistant to the division chief who is primarily responsible for imputing procurement 
requests… researchers can do it and some of them do…it takes more [of a researcher’s time] time to work that 
system and to work issues associated with that system.  It takes away from their ability to actually do research.” 
(Researcher B, transcript 2-11-04) 
The issue was not the abilities of the individuals – as researchers are highly technical people who often interface 
with extremely complex systems.  The “super-user” mentioned above did not avoid the system based on inability, 
but rather, on the principle that it took away from his time doing research.  Other researchers expressed an element 
of disdain for work that was not contributing to research goals.  One researcher put it rather clearly when he 
indicated that researchers are “buying toilet paper… literally… that are high paid people” (Researcher C, transcript 
2-17-04). 
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However, some researchers did report direct use of the system to do their own purchasing, much the way that the 
implementers of the ERP system intended.  In one case, the researcher compared the new system to the previous 
paper-based purchase request form.  He identified administrative duties as part of his job, and felt that his position 
required him to be concerned with “accounting, budgeting, and resource management” activities (Researcher A, 
interview transcript 2-5-04).  This researcher indicated that adoption of the system for purchasing activity is not 
unproblematic, and he indicates that he addresses this through “cheat sheets” and grouping purchases together at a 
single time: 
“A co-worker of mine – came up with a “cheat sheet” and “click this” and “fill in this” and “do that”… I try to 
avoid it until I have a bunch of things I need to order and then I might have to write five P-card orders at the same 
time… And so these I do, like I said, about once a month, so not being a frequent user and this not being an intuitive 
interface for me, I usually get out my cheat sheet to create a thing.” (Researcher A, transcript 2-5-04) 
Four years later, our analysis shows that researchers continue to avoid use of the system in general, but now such 
researcher avoidance has become standard practice.  In each research group we studied there are a limited number of 
people who are certified as “requisitioners” (typically clerical staff or technicians) and these requisitioners must go 
through annual training.  In the case of Researcher A, he continues to do his own purchase requisitions, but he now 
appears to be an anomaly, rather than standard practice. 
An interesting point about the format of the purchase requisitions is that in the past requisitioners informally 
included notes about the purchase in the unspecified “header” field.  Over time, however, certain units began to 
request information in the header field – often information that was already inputted in the designated fields of the 
system.  Now a great deal of information that is included in fields throughout the system is also formally required to 
be included in the header, including product, vendor, requisitoner, and approver information. While walking us 
through her use of the system, a requisitioner describes how this happened: 
“Here’s fund approver.  This person might just be a manager or program manager who has no idea how to use SAP 
or enter PRs but they’ve just been taught how to go approve it.  When they open it, they’re just going to look at this 
and see what we’re buying.  They’re not going to know how to go in there and figure it out”. (Administrative 
contactor A, transcript 2-6-08)   
Also, now even with P-card purchases, researchers go through requisioners,. An enhanced P-card requisition 
capability has been developed in the ERP system, and there are dedicated individuals who audit compliance with the 
$3000 P-card limit.  A power requisioner in one of the research groups described what led to this situation:    
“If it was over three thousand dollars which was the P-card limit, you could say, “Bill me three times.”  Then you 
call the credit card and say, “Give me two thousand, two thousand, two thousand.”  You can bill it for six thousand 
dollars… we got caught a couple of times... Now sensitive items like cameras and computer stuff you can’t buy 
anymore.  People were just buying computers and cameras like crazy… There’s a person who tracks it and if they 
see you, they know what you’re doing.” (Technician A, transcript 3-17-08). 
Although P-cards are heavily scrutinized, there is still a great deal of incentive to use them, since they require fewer 
approvals and oftentimes researchers want to avoid government sourcing procedures that require a longer bidding 
process, a focus on less expensive suppliers, and stricter requirements on the type of product the researcher can buy.  
To get around the scrutiny of the auditor, researchers often “spin a few dates” (Technician A, transcript 3-17-08) 
and find ways to avoid being caught doing so. 
Further, since NASA is part of the U.S. government, it is under significant pressure to be fair and objective in its 
vendor selection practices.  Researchers, however, develop good relationships with certain vendors over time and 
often have specialized knowledge about products that steer them to specific vendors.  Although the highly 
rationalized purchase requisition system is intended to enforce impartial purchasing decisions through layers and 
bidding practices, one way a number of researchers and requisitioners reported circumvention of this simply by 
requesting a spec, any spec, that that vendor has that its competitors do not.  With this small adjustment to purchase 
specifications, researchers can avoid the rationality intended to be enforced by the system:  
“Technically it will say with a SAP, you should have three vendors.  From those three vendors, the one you want is 
the cheapest.  There are ways to get around.  …  “What do you have in your machine that nobody else has?”  That’s 
what you put in as a spec.” (Technician A, transcript 3-17-08) 
Social Aspects of IS Track 
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Activity Reporting Loose Coupling – Time Reporting 
A primary mechanism for streamlining NASA and aligning the Agency with funded programs involves “Full Cost” 
activity-based time reporting activity in the ERP system.  In the wake of the system implementation, all hours of 
research, engineering, and service pool time must be billed either to a specific program or to a catch-all G&A 
(General & Administrative) account for each center.  Tracking researcher time is an attempt to more tightly couple 
their activity to the specific projects and programs.  Increased visibility of this sort flies directly in the face of the 
instinct for self-preservation of those groups that are involved in currently unpopular research.  Such groups look to 
remain “below the radar” to keep them going until one day they are vindicated (stories pervade the Agency – much 
like myths or legends - about unpopular, obscure research that one day became critical to NASA’s mission).  Local 
research managers vary in the way they have their researchers track time.  While some stick fairly well to 
expectations, others minimize the time billed to G&A to make their groups look better.  Looking better was 
important, as groups are under pressure to put forth the best possible appearance in order to justify their existence 
and thus be able to court funding in the future.  Interviews indicated that the research work of any given group was 
important and that the group’s researchers were valuable and therefore must be maintained.  In one case, a high-
level research manager rationalized billing G&A researcher time to projects as follows: 
“You ask employees to charge all their time to a project and they push back saying, well the time we spent at a 
branch meeting, we can’t charge that to a particular project.  I say, spread it across … may not directly be in 
support of a project, but indirectly they support, they make you a more knowledgeable person about the things that 
are happening at the center.  So … some benefits to a project.” (Center Division Chief A, transcript 2-19-04) 
In another case, the Ames Research Center creatively accounted for pooled resources that it did not want to lose: 
“Ames is saying, ‘we don’t even have service pools, sorry.  We direct charge everything.’  So what they’re claiming 
is they’ve put everything into, I call it a service pool, but they call it “service activities”… its perception and 
interpretation of [full cost standards].” (Full Cost Instructor A, transcript 2-12-04) 
Reflecting this rationale in time-reporting activities, many researchers look to categorize as much activity as 
possible in line with the programs: 
“Well, if you’re going to charge to overhead tasks, it looks like you spent a lot of time on something and didn’t get 
much done. Don’t charge to overhead because it makes us look bad.  It’s better off to have the people look like they 
cost less and that they’re inefficient than it is to have the people cost more but when they are working a task, they’re 
efficient.” (Researcher D, transcript 3-2-04) 
This mentality is echoed in the perspectives of a number of different researchers and research managers.  While 
reporting all time to projects appears to be the universally-accepted practice, many managers do not justify it 
unproblematically such as the manager mentioned above:   
“Generally people are told to charge their time to either the project they just finished or the one that’s coming up 
because they want to keep their overhead rates down.  Supervisors who never had anything to do with the test – 
don’t even know what the test is about – are even charging their time to the projects, too and so you end up with [a 
skewed] number of what it really costs to run a facility or to do a test.” (Research Manager D, transcript 2-17-04).  
Also, in 2004, a number of researchers used fairly strong language to describe what they thought of allocating 
overhead activities to projects as lacking “integrity” and a “conflict”, using terms such as “lying” (Researcher F, 
interview transcript 3-4-04):   
“There’s still attempts, it looks to me, at the lowest level to hide what really goes on, to mask the amount of 
overhead that the researcher is burdened with so that we look good on paper…there are a lot of things that we’re 
asked to do that don’t have charge codes and we’re told just to charge them to the projects… Well, we feel like 
we’re lying when we’re reporting our time.  So how does that meet NASA’s standards” (Researcher B, transcript 2-
11-04). 
Four years later full cost no longer exists as it did in 2004.  The G&A pool was getting bloated – especially at poorer 
centers like Glenn, which hit a vicious cycle of costing themselves out of projects, thus bloating G&A and further 
increasing costs - and there was a gross inconsistency between the way centers interpreted things, such as with 
service pools at Ames mentioned above.  Also, Griffin came in and changed the story from “One Nasa” to “Ten 
Healthy Centers” and actively focused on steering business away from contractors and toward internal Centers.   
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“‘One NASA’ is looking for the best place to get the work done.  ‘Ten Healthy Centers’ is looking for the best place 
to get the work done and making sure that if there are two places to get the work done and somebody’s got a full 
plate in one, you go to the other one who may need more work… O’Keefe to Griffin it was contract out versus the 
expertise within.” (Project Manager E, transcript 2-11-08) 
What was once G&A became a special program with associated projects funded from HQ and now called CM&O 
(Center Management & Operations).  There is now no way for anyone to bill there time to anything other than a 
project (CM&O or otherwise) – except for authorized veteran research managers who can bill to a “technological 
excellence” account, rather than burdening programs with overhead. On the surface it appears as though now action 
is far more tightly coupled to the system.  In fact, researchers tend to divvy their time proportionally to budgets 
based on how much time they are allowed to bill to each budget.  So even if a researcher spends all of his time on a 
single project over the course of a given month, if he is able to bill to three projects proportionally he does so.   
“You have several projects that you work on and you’re allowed to charge so much time.  The challenge is to try to 
make sure you get enough time to get a forty-hour week.  Then you divide it in proportion to what you’re allowed.  
Actually very few people really put the number of hours on there that they really worked on a project.  They get so 
much and they just distribute it, because it’s way too hard to keep track.  … People don’t count how many hours 
they work on each thing and then charge that way, because it would never come out to be forty hours and it would 
be too complicated.”(Researcher C, transcript 2-4-08) 
Further, meetings, travel,(interviews with researchers) etc., are all billed to specific projects.  What is interesting is 
researchers do not seem to have a problem with this anymore – they think of it in terms of “wrapped cost”.  So 
projects do not pay for the work that gets done for their project, but they pay for the time that they have budgeted.  
Further, the uniformity of applying standards - across a center or between centers - for billing is often questioned: 
“I don’t think there’s uniformity across the center.  I think different organizations are working still to different rules.  
A supervisor of a research organization, does he charge direct to projects or does he charge indirect to some 
CMNO account?  Secretaries, do they charge direct or do they chare indirect?  There’s not a uniform adherence to 
any set of rules in my opinion.”  (Project Manager F, transcript 2-4-08) 
Project managers have mixed feelings about this, many sincerely believing that researchers do, in fact, report the 
actual time they spend on their projects, where the problem is not with researchers on their projects, but with others 
that do not have funding: 
“It’s not as broke as it may sound like.  There are pockets of that.  I would think if you lost your [billing number] for 
twenty percent of your work and you have to charge it to something, you’re more inclined to bill one that you have.  
But if you lost the eighty percent one and you know the twenty percent project can’t support you, you’re more 
inclined to go grab somebody else’s WBS.  That to me is a bigger problem.  Reporting doesn’t flag it right away.  
There’s no limitation on work authorization.  You’re not allowed to bill that.  You can’t pull that [billing numbers]... 
We’re doing more of that policing from a project management standpoint than managing the project.” (Project 
Manager G, transcript 2-4-08). 
Thus in 2008 we found a great deal of discussion on “surfing” various billing numbers, on the part of people in the 
Agency.  Sometimes sincerely and sometimes illegitimately, many individuals in performing organizations are 
actively looking for projects to continually bill their time.  Thus all project managers we interviewed, just as Project 
Manager G above, reported spending a great deal of time retrospectively monitoring and following-up on people 
who report time to their billing numbers.   
Systems Loose Coupling – Project Tracking 
Project managers often identified themselves with managing variance.  As they attempt to manage and track 
scientific and engineering projects, budgets exist, but the timing of activity, magnitude of expenditures, and project 
outcomes all vary – and project managers pride themselves on accurately gauging and communicating this variance.  
The ERP system, however, accounts for fixed budgets, fixed calendar-based time frames, and tracks expenses when 
recognized rather than accrued.  Not surprisingly, we found project management activity was often loosely coupled 
to the ERP system. The ERP system allows for fixed budgets and fixed timing of budgets.  Research and 
engineering progress and accompanying expenses, on the other hand are difficult to predict and rife with variance.  
After the system’s implementation, one project manager was quite adamant about the inappropriateness of the ERP 
system for her job due to project variance: 
Social Aspects of IS Track 
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“That means absolutely nothing to a project manager like myself who is tracking plans versus actuals.  What are my 
variances?  Who blew my budget?  Who’s overrunning?  Who’s under running?  To me a ledger was not going to 
help me very much with that”. (Project Manager A, transcript 2-9-04) 
Many project managers resisted using the system initially.  The implementation team considered the ERP system as 
simply a “new” way of managing budgets, and generally seemed to think that project manager adoption was simply 
a case of learning the tool, and therefore unplugged the legacy system and forced project managers to work within 
ERP.  However, project managers simply could not get the reporting they needed out of ERP, so the implementation 
team customized a reporting tool to accommodate project manager requests. Despite this accommodation, many 
project managers indicated that they managed projects outside of the system – on “shadow systems” – only to 
periodically reconcile the data in these outside systems with ERP.  This activity is widely prevalent across the 
project manager community, and the project managers that report this activity often explicitly call out variance as 
important to guiding their activity: 
“We’re still... using offline systems, planning spreadsheets… we use the business warehouse [reporting tool for 
ERP] as a data source... extract the data off and still put it in our front end that we give the project managers in 
their monthly status report. We build a phasing plan at the project level offline from the center-level system. Okay. 
We extract the actuals off the center-level system and marry it up with our plan offline. And that’s the report the 
project managers use . . . to status variance.” (Project Manager E, transcript 2-26-04) 
Shortly after the implementation of the system, project managers were generally disgruntled with the system 
because it simply did not support their work as well as the previous systems did. 
“Here at Glenn, we had developed an electronic PR system.  We had a whole lot of things that were done 
electronically already that all wound up being taken away from us.  We wound up taking two steps backwards from 
where we were at the time they implemented [ERP] … The people had to be trained in this new system.  It wasn’t 
intuitive.  You had to write your own queries.  The reported just didn’t do it for people.  They were different.  
Information was different.  There was a lot of negative pushback because we have been spoiled because our 
computer people developed these reports based on what project managers had asked them for over a period of 
years… I could get on the system, I could print out reports, I could see who’s charging to my project, how many 
hours they charged.  I could see what the status of my travel account was.  I could see how much procurement was 
spent.  The reports were intuitive.  That all went by the wayside and it’s taken five years to get to the point where 
you have people in place now that you go to, because I can’t build a query to save my life.”  (Project Manager C, 
transcript 2-15-08) 
Thus the notion of having project managers directly access the system was abandoned.  Instead “Business 
managers” were assigned to support a team of project managers and to interact with the system for the bigger 
projects, and for the smaller projects, these teams shared certain financial (RAMO) analysts.  While financial 
analysts pull data directly from the system for their projects, the business analysts we interviewed continued to use 
shadow systems to process reporting data.  It went from direct, loosely coupled access, to intermediated (process 
task) loosely coupled access and project managers were much happier. However, many of these same project 
managers, were, in fact, now enthused about the system.  ERP-related integration enables unprecedented 
collaboration between centers  through visibility of resources associated with cross-center projects.  One project 
manager reported the ability to move funds between centers in just a couple of clicks: 
“The project manager here at Glenn was in charge of the whole project and his subproject manager at Langley was 
running out of funds.  They’d say, “I need more money.  I can’t finish this task.”  Then he got to work with the 
finance person here at Glenn.  We’d have to put in a request to Headquarters to actually take money from our 
guideline, take it back to Headquarters.  They’d have to reissue it to Langley.  Now, we can just move money 
between centers.”  (Project Manager C, transcript 2-15-08) 
Further, there is a positive attitude about how the ERP system could help small centers like Glenn to be on equal 
footing with some of the powerful centers (like Marshall & Johnson).   In this context, any inconveniences to the 
project managers, minor inefficiencies associated with redundant data paled in comparison to some of the broader 
themes within the agency, one project manager referred to the ERP implementation as an “aside” to some of the 
dramatic changes relating to a revised focus on the space program (Bush’s “Vision for Space Exploration”): 
“What you’re looking at is probably an aside from all the changes that happened from a programmatic 
standpoint… It was an announcement by the President at NASA Headquarters that said we are going back [to the 
moon].  We’re going to start flying the shuttle again.  We’re going to finish the Space Station.  We’re going to take 
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human presence and establish it on the moon as a means to go to Mars and then beyond.  After that, not only the 
President’s pronouncement of that but Congress had its own authorization language that said, “Yeah verily, this is 
the right thing for the country to do and for NASA to do for the country.”  So everything was in lockstep to maybe 
not change the direction of the agency but focus the direction of the agency.  To me, that’s the foundation of 
anything the agency’s doing… from the atmosphere on Mars, that requires fluid physics, material handling, 
combustion or chemical reaction processes.  Those fairly independent organizations now had to start working 
together.  We had to start working together with very ill-defined requirements.  We had to reinvent how we worked 
together.  I can say that the whole [ERP] side of things, that was an aside, a noise if you will on us changing how we 
were working and our working relationships.”  (Project Manager E, transcript 2-11-08) 
Discussion 
Our longitudinal analysis of three business processes related to NASA’s enterprise system implementation, purchase 
requisitioning, time reporting, and project tracking, exhibited instances of loose coupling across each of the three 
domains we elicited from the literature: (1) system loose coupling; (2)  process task loose coupling; and (3) activity 
reporting loose coupling.  It is important to note that these categories are not mutually exclusive.  Just as data 
integration is a necessary prerequisite for process integration (Kobayashi et al, 2003), so is the tight coupling of 
work systems necessary for practices to be tightly coupled to the data in the enterprise system that is intended to 
represent these practices.  Each form emphasizes alignment at a different level:  systems at a technological level; 
process tasks at a procedural level, and reporting activities at a level of human interpretation.   
To make sense of this grounded analysis of the NASA ERP implementation; we will enlist two opposing images of 
post implementation ERP-related activity.  The first image, that of “mutual adaptation” (Leonard-Barton 1988), is 
one that is widely utilized in both the information systems discipline at large (i.e., Tyre & Orlikowski 1994), as well 
as research that specifically addresses enterprise systems (i.e., Soh & Sia 2004).  Since enterprise systems rarely fit 
existing practices immediately, mutual adaptation involves cycles of change to both the system and existing practice, 
eventually resulting in alignment between practices and the system.  In the language of tight coupling, this could 
mean that ostensive (ERP-embedded) and performative (situated practice) aspects of organizational processes over 
time converge and become tightly coupled.   
The second image we leverage is that of “drift” (Ciborra 2000).  The notion of drift indicates that enterprise systems, 
which are intended to control and rationalize activity, are overlaid on situated, messy organizational activity that 
simply cannot be rationalized.  As this messy reality interacts with the system, it results in unexpected adaptations 
and “reinventions” of the system.  These adaptations typically require further attempts at control, which, in turn, 
results in greater reinvention. Using our loose coupling terminology, the ostensive aspects are continually changing 
to keep pace with performative practice, but the interaction of this changing ostensive aspect of the activity interacts 
with and changes the performative aspect.  In contrast with the image of mutual adaptation, the image of drift does 
not emphasizes moments of equilibrium, but instead highlights activity associated with disequilibrium and argues 
that any state of equilibrium is only temporary. Our images of mutual adaptation and drift both imply a dialectic 
relationship between changing ostensive and performative aspects of business processes, but their directions are 
different: as the former heads toward convergence, the latter move toward divergence.  Taken a step further, a lens 
of mutual adaptation promises eventual integration, if only the system and practice would be properly changed 
together, while the lens of drift implies that this quest for complete integration is futile.   
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These images of mutual adaptation and drift both imply a dialectic relationship between changing ostensive and 
performative aspects of business processes, but their directions are different: as the former heads toward 
convergence, the latter move toward divergence.  Taken a step further, a lens of mutual adaptation promises 
eventual integration, if only the system and practice would be properly changed together, while the lens of drift 
implies that this quest for complete integration is futile.  Next we turn to lessons from our data, and derive 
theoretical insight based on these two images for the study of enterprise systems using the perspective of loose 
coupling (Table 3).  
The first observation we make from the data is that of the three business processes that are loosely coupled from the 
system in 2004, all three remain loosely coupled in some form or another in 2008 –  despite radical changes to the 
Agency and the system in those four years. For example, researchers, who are the originators of procurement 
activity, were originally expected to work through the system for their purchases, but instead they circumvented 
system use with P-cards and intermediaries.  Four years later, the role of the intermediaries that were once illicit are 
now institutionalized within the process activities and even undergo a certification process.  In essence, the activities 
that enabled ostensive aspects of the performative practice later became the performative practice.  Similarly, as 
project managers, as key consumers of certain forms of data, struggled in getting the information they needed and 
enlisted the aid of shadow systems to intermediate their interaction with the data in the system, but even with the 
help of these shadow systems, they had problems as project managers were simply not adept at writing database 
queries.  Over time human intermediaries – those that were trained to write queries and generate reports – were put 
in place, and many of these human intermediaries continue to use shadow systems.   
Also, we identify an interesting case of loose coupling - the redundant information in the header of the ERP 
purchase requisition form is now NASA policy and actually illustrates a situation where the enterprise system is 
loosely coupled with itself! These examples point to loose coupling through certain intermediaries between both 
data consumers and data producers with the enterprise system.  These activities do not appear to be drifting, yet they 
are not aligned in the sense that the system is tightly coupled with the entire organization.  Thus we have examples 
where mutual adaptation did appear to occur, but resulted in a form of loosely coupled equilibrium.  These examples 
did involve intermediaries –in the form of humans with or without shadow systems (a human does reconcile the 
header with the data in the other fields, so is therefore a human intermediary, and the header becomes a form of 
shadow system within the system), but this loose coupling, certainly from the perspectives of researchers, project 
managers, and purchase approvers, is most certainly a good thing.  Apparently from those in control of the system it 
is also a good thing, because these intermediaries became legitimized over time.   
Therefore, our first conjecture is that loose coupling between performative aspects of business processes and 
the ostensive aspects embedded in the enterprise system, when enabled by human and/or system 
intermediaries, may result in a specific form of alignment we describe as “loosely coupled equilibrium,” the 
persistence of which can benefit the organization by freeing up knowledge workers.  A key trade-off involves 
the utilization of non-integrated activities of (typically clerical) intermediary roles or non-integrated software 
packages, but this may be necessary until individual learning curves and related costs approach zero.  
In other procurement-related situations, however, control has been exercised on limiting P-card purchases in 
response to certain activities that circumvented control, such as the splitting up of purchases in increments and the 
purchase of sensitive product such as personal computers.  Further, researchers also avoided imperatives of the 
system such as the rationalized selection of vendors or the limitation of certain “sensitive” products such as personal 
computers.  As control is tightened over these activities, researchers are still finding ways to get what they want, and 
not subjecting themselves to the complete control of the imperatives of the system.   
In time reporting, what appeared a wildly ad-hoc and unstandardized activity in 2004 evolved into what appears to 
be practices that are significantly more disciplined, but still not tightly coupled.  As a matter of fact, one could argue 
that certain activities may have been more tightly coupled in 2004.  For example, if researchers billed their time 
proportionally to projects in 2004, the coupling of this performative (actual research in line with a project, for 
example) aspect of their work remains consistently loosely coupled.  However, if they billed their time faithfully 
between work on projects and the G&A account, but are now just spreading it evenly, one could argue that their 
activity has been decoupled to an extent.  The replacement of the G&A “catch-all” account with a specific CM&O 
program was an attempt to increase control on time reporting.  This resulted in the proportional allocation of time, 
and the increasing phenomenon of “surfing” across funding codes.  Such activity requires project managers to spend 
more time monitoring and investigating situations where people bill to their accounts.  As time continues to go 
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inconsistently reported, and researchers continue to circumvent the imperatives of the system, effort is made to 
control this activity, which results in newer, unforeseen adaptations.   
The common thread between these examples is that human interpretation mediates between performative aspects of 
processes and the ostensible aspects represented by the data in the system.  Individuals interpret the specs for newly 
purchase equipment and individuals interpret how they spend their time.  Whether this form of loose coupling is 
beneficial for NASA is far more equivocal than the loose coupling enabled by intermediaries.  From the perspective 
of the data within the enterprise system, this form of loose coupling undermines imperatives, or business rules, 
embedded in the system and can call to question the very relevance of the data in the system itself.  However, from 
the perspective of the individual, this loose coupling through interpretation carves out a space where they can 
engage in the flexible, situated activites.  Stemming from this, possibly irreconcilable contrast between global and 
local interests, it appears that such loose coupling which is enabled by human interpretation is precisely the form of 
loose coupling that results in drift.  
Thus, our second conjecture is that loose coupling between performative aspects of business processes and the 
ostensive aspects embedded in the enterprise system, when mediated by human interpretation, may result in 
cycles of drift, which can enable situated action yet undermine aspects of control and data integrity.  A key 
trade-off involves reconciling global and local logics of action.  
Conclusion 
Through our longitudinal analysis of specific examples of loose coupling in the wake of NASA’s enterprise system 
implementation, we find that both images of mutual adaptation and drift apply to different forms of loose coupling 
in our data.  In both the “process task” and “system” forms of loose coupling, we find either human mediation or 
system mediation which enables the loose coupling of the performative and ostensive aspects of practice.  In both of 
these cases the satisfaction of the NASA’s researchers and project managers increased with the intermediation.  
Although the complete integration intended in the original implementation – where all professionals directly use the 
system – has not been realized, effectively the relevant data is integrated while simultaneously freeing NASA’s 
professional staff from learning and using the enterprise system.  Using the enterprise system for activities such as 
purchasing and project reporting are not trivial tasks – often an enterprise system requires users to become a form of 
“hybrid accountant” (Caglio 2003), which may not make sense for NASA’s professional staff.  At NASA, the users 
are literal rocket scientists.  They are conducting some of the most innovative research in the world, there is little 
justification to turn such invaluable knowledge resources into the hybrid accountants all users must become as they 
engage enterprise systems.  In this sense, loose coupling, although apparently inefficient due to resource 
redundancy, can actually enable superior organizational outcomes. 
In other situations, however, this focus on the local, situated aspects of enterprise system usage may compromise the 
value of the enterprise system as a whole.  In both the procurement and time keeping examples, where human 
interpretation mediated system use – that is, situations where individuals “spin” the data in accordance with local 
concerns – the validity of the data in the system and the rationalization this data represents can be severely 
compromised.  As a key goal of the enterprise system involves the standardization of data, it is imperative that the 
local incentive structure be consistent with the standardized data structure, or human interpretation may render 
certain aspects of the data in the system meaningless from a standpoint of accountability and control. 
Thus the key contributions of this research involve the explicit treatment of different forms of loose coupling over 
time in the wake of a major enterprise system implementation.  We find that loose coupling involves tradeoffs.  In 
certain circumstances loose coupling can be beneficial for the organization; in others it may compromise the 
meaning of the data in the system.  Further, to the alignment borne of mutual adaptation and the cycles of 
organizational drift, we add a third potential outcome of loose coupling over time: a semi-permanent state of loosely 
coupled equilibrium.  This state involves the institutionalization of loosely coupled activity to enable simultaneous 
system success and locally situated activity.   
As organizations spend hundreds of billions of dollars on enterprise systems, it is imperative that they understand 
the notion of loose coupling and its applications in this domain.  Loose coupling can foster innovation, can render 
ERP data meaningless, can provide a space for individual flexibility, and can undermine accountability. This study 
is an initial effort to understand the dynamics and effects of loose coupling associated with enterprise systems over 
time. 
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